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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE
COMMENTARY
Uniform Commercial Code—Sections 9-503, 9.504—Due Process —
Adams v. Egley'—On June 17, 1968, plaintiff Adams obtained a loan
of one thousand dollars from the Bank of La Jolla, executing a
security agreement and a promissory note in favor of the bank.
The security agreement provided that if the debtor defaulted on
principal or interest payments, the Secured Party would have "all of
the rights and remedies of a Secured Party under the California Uniform
Commercial Code. . . ." 2 Included in these rights were the repossession
rights under Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the U.C.C.2 A short time
thereafter, the defendant Southern California First National Bank
became the successor in interest to the Bank of La Jolla. The plaintiff
failed to make his payments, and the defendant Egley, acting for the
bank, repossessed two of the three vehicles described as collateral in the
security agreement and sold them at a private sale.
1
 388 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.Cal. 1972).
2 Id. at 616.
a U,C.C. 9-503 provides;
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take pos-
session of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured
party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably con-
venient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment
unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section
9-504.
U.C.C. I 9-504 provides:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any
or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially
reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the Article
on Sales (Article 2). The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order
following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale,
selling and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agree-
ment and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and
legal expenses incurred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest
under which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security
interest in the collateral if written notification of demand thereof
is received before distribution of the proceeds is completed, If re-
quested by the secured party, the holder of a subordinate security
interest must seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and
unless he does so, the secured party need not comply with his
demand.
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must
account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor
is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of ac-
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The issue before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California on plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judg-
ment involved the constitutionality of Sections 9503 and 9504 of the
California Commerical Code, providing for the secured party's right
of repossession and disposition upon the debtor's default. 4
 The court
' counts, contract rights, or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus
or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides.
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings
and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition
may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms
but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place
and terms must be commercially reasonable Unless collateral is perishable or
threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public
sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
' debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has
a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing state-
ment indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or who is known by the
secured party to have a security interest in the collateral. The secured party may
buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a
recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed
standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the dis-
position transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein,
discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security interest
or Hen subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such rights and in-
terests even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of
this Part or of any judicial proceedings.
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of
any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with
the secured party, other bidders or the person conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorse-
ment, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral
from the secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and
duties 'of the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or dis-
position of the collateral under this Article.
CAll citations to the Uniform Commercial Code will be to the 1962 Official Text.]
4 Cal. Commercial Code §§ 9503-9504 (West 1964). These sections are verbatim
adoptions of Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 3,
except that subsection (3) of section 9-504 has been expanded in the California statute to
read as follows:
A sale or lease of collateral may be as a unit or in parcels, at wholesale
or retail and at any time and place and on any terms;provided the secured party
acts in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Unless collateral
is perishable'or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized' market, the secured party must give to the debtor, and
to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral and who has
filed with the secured party a written request for notice giving his address, a
notice in writing of the time and place of any public sale or of the time on or
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made. Such
notice must be delivered personally or be deposited in the United States mail
postage prepaid addressed to the debtor at his address as set forth In the
financing statement or as set forth in the security agreement or at such other
'address as may have been furnished •
 to the secured party in writing for'this
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had to decide whether the repossessions which occurred represented
"takings without due process of law, thus denying plaintiffs their con-
stitutional rights."'i The District Court for the Southern District , of
California HELD: Sections 9503 and 9504 of the California Com-
merical Code, which authorize such takings, violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The impact of the court's hold-
ing is that the once powerful creditor remedy of non-judicial reposses-
sion is no longer available in California. This note will examine the
Adams holding in light of other recent cases dealing with prejudgment
remedies.
In reaching its decision, the Adams court relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.° In
Sniadach, the Court held that the WisConsin prejudgment wage garnish-
ment procedure, which permitted a taking of property without prior
notice and a fair hearing, lacked the procedural due process required
by the Fourteenth Amendment.? Never before had the Court found that
due process required a prior hearing in the case of prejudgment attach-
ments. Earlier decision either ignored or considered insignificant the
temporary loss of the property attached.'
Although the Sniadach decision turned on due process issues, as was
recognized in Adams, it may be interpreted as possessing strong equal
purpose, or, if no address has been so set forth or furnished, at his last known
address, and to any other secured party at the address set forth in his request
for notice, at least five days before the date fixed for any public sale or before
the day on or after which any private sale or other disposition is to be made.
Notice of the time and place of a public sale shall also be given at least five
days before the date of sale by publication once in a newspaper of general circula-
tion published in the county in which the sale is to be held. Any public sale
shall be held in the county or place specified in the security agreement, or if
no county or place is specified in the security agreement, in the county in which
the collateral or any part thereof is located or in the county in which the debtor
has his residence or chief place of business, or in the county in which the secured
party has his residence or a place of business if the debtor does not have a
residence or chief place of business within this State. If the collateral is located
outside of this State or has been removed from this State, a public sale may be
held in the locality in which the collateral is located. Any public sale may be
postponed from time to time by public announcement at the time and place
last scheduled for the sale. The secured party may buy at any public sale and
if the collateral is customarily sold in a recognized market or is the subject of
widely or regularly distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private
sale. Any sale of which notice is delivered or mailed and published as herein
provided and which is held as herein provided is a public sale.
45 338 F. Supp. at 618. The case also involved important jurisdictional issues, i.e.,
whether the acts of repossession were made "under color of state law" as required under
the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and whether
the enactment of sections 9503 and 9504, authorizing such acts, constitutes sufficient state
action to raise a federal question. The court resolved both questions in the affirmative.
For a relevant discussion of these jurisdictional problems, see Black, Foreward: "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69 (1967).
6 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7 Id. at 342.
8 Note, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1969).
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protection implications as wel1. 9 A concern for the inequities in the area
of consumer credit manifestS itself throughout the Court's due process
discussion. The author of Sniadach, Mr. Justice Douglas, viewed pre-
judgment statutes as imposing a "tremendous hardship" on "wage
earners with families to support" and placed considerable weight on
the injustice of the process.'
The Sniadach Court further indicated certain limitations inherent
in the application of due process standards to prejudgment remedies:
[Although the] summary procedure [established by the Wis-
consin statute] may well meet the requirements of due process
in extraordinary situations. .. , in the present case no situation
requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is
presented. . . ; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn
to meet any unusual condition. 11
Even though the Sniadach Court did not elaborate on what would con-
stitute an "extraordinary situation," the cases cited in the opinion in-
dicate the determinative factors. In Ownbey v. Morgan," a resident
creditor's prejudgment attachment of a nonresident's property was
allowed in order to obtain "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction. The seizure of
nonresident assets is frequently the only effective remedy for injuries
inflicted by nonresidents. Furthermore, the resulting hardship to the
debtor is minimal since his "necessities" are within his home state."
Two other cases, Fahey v. Mallonee'4 and Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennet," involved the imminent failure of banking institutions and
the immediate need for specialized government personnel to seize opera-
tional control of banking assets. Considering the public danger inherent
in the situation and the regulated nature of the industry, an "extraor-
dinary" problem was presented, and summary procedures were justified.
An even more compelling case for the elimination of due process re-
quirements was Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.," which in-
volved multiple seizures by the Federal Food and Drug Administrator
of misbranded articles found to be materially misleading to the con-
9 Comment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 942, 954 (1970).
10 395 U.S. at 340. In his opinion, Justice Douglas quotes Congressman Sullivan's
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs:
What we know from our study of this problem is that in a vast number of
cases the debt is a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person who is
trapped in an easy credit nightmare in which he is charged double for something
he could not pay for even if the proper price was called for, and then hounded
into giving up his pound of flesh, and being fired besides.
Id. at 341.
11
 Id. at 339.
12 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
13 Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Sup. Ct. of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 555, 488
P.2d 13, 25, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721 (1971).
14 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
15 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
10 339 U.S. 594, 595-96 (1950).
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sumer. The Ewing Court held that because of the "injurious consequen-
ces of protracted proceedings," the "speedy, preventive device of
multiple seizures" was necessary.'
Thus Fahey, Coffin, and Ewing all possess certain distinguishing
features. First, the seizures were initiated to benefit the general public
and not to serve the interests of a private creditor. Second, authorized
public officials, bound to act in furtherance of the general welfare, were
charged with responsibility for the seizures. Third, the risk of potential
harm demanded immediate action. Fourth, the goods appropriated were
not "necessities." Finally, the statutes providing for the "takings" were
narrowly drawn and permitted summary procedures only when neces-
sary."
Under the Sniadach test, then, the constitutionality of an attach-
ment statute depends on the following variables: hardship, the existence
of an extraordinary situation, the narrowness of the statute in question,
and provision made in the statute for adequate notice and a prior
hearing.1° For a statute to pass constitutional muster, each of the
aforementioned criteria must be satisfied. In setting forth for the first
time the due process requirements of prejudgment remedies, the
Sniadach decision laid the groundwork for major constitutional reform
in this area.
The district court decision in Adams v. Egley follows as a logical
extension of the Supreme Court's opinion in Sniadach. In declaring
unconstitutional Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the Adams court invalidated the powerful creditor remedy of
self-help. Past decisions had struck down statutes authorizing the
taking of collateral upon the issuance of judicial proCess," but never
before had the secured party's private right to non-judicial repossession
been affected.
Under Section 9-503 of the Code, "	 nless otherwise agreed a
secured party has on default the' right to take possession of the
collateral. . .without judicial processif this can be done without breach
of the peace. . . ." 21 The advantages of this right are enormous: costly
legal fees are avoided," immediate unofficial repossession protects the
goods from loss or destruction, and the threat of repossession gives the
creditor added leverage vis-a-vis the debtor. In view of the importance
of this creditor remedy, the court's requirement of prior notice and
hearing is bound to have a far-reaching effect on the extension of con-
sumer credit.
17 Id. at 601.
18 5 Cal. 3d at 554, 488 P.2d at 24-25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21.
19 Note, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1254, 1266 (1970).
20 Swarb V. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (ED. Pa. 1970), aff'd, ____ U.S.
92 S. Ct. 767 (1972). Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Sup. Ct. of Sacramento C6., 5 Cal.
3d 536, 544, 488 P.2d 13, 17, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1971).
21 See note 3 supra,
22 Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 Minn.
L. Rev. 205, 211 (1962); Comment, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 435 (1969).
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Yet, given the scope of the applicable law, the decision to declare
sections 9-503 and 9-504 unconstitutional was almost incumbent on the
court. The cases cited in the opinion constitute a solid foundation
upon which the court's conclusions are based. Santiago v. McElroy' and
Swarb v. Lennox" furnish sufficient precedent for the court's conclusion
that the contractual waiver is ineffective and that the debtor's rights
under Sniadach are enforceable. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co."
and Blair v. Pitchess2° support the court's position that procedural due
process requires prior notice and hearing despite the presence of
a security agreement.
Of paramount significance in the Adams opinion are the nature of
the parties to the security agreement and the type of collateral involved.
In distinguishing among different types of debtors and collateral',
Adams also finds support in prior case law. The Tenth Circuit, in
Brunswick Corp. v. J.P., Inc., 27 indicated its willingness to uphold a
security agreement between commercial parties of equal bargaining
strength where the collateral is of a non-essential nature. In Swarb v.
Lennox," a three-judge district court panel held that confession of
judgment clauses in consumer credit agreements did not constitute a
waiver of the right to notice and hearing as to those debtors with in-
comes under ten thousand dollars. As to this class, the court ruled that
the plaintiffs had established that there had been no "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 29 More-
over, the district.court in Swarb added, important dicta relevant to the
facts in Adams. The court said that where the debtor is an attorney,
all that may be necessary to establish his understanding of the terms
of the agreement is an affidavit of his profession. On the other hand,
where the 'debtor is a non-high school graduate, far greater proof is
needed." The Supreme Court, while affirming the judgment, did not
deal with this line of reasoning.
In Santiago v. McElroy," the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania went even further than did the
Swarb court in rejecting the claimed waiver of the right to prior notice
and hearing. In Santiago, the court considered the issue of whether the
distress sales under the distraint procedures of the Pennsylvania
Landlord and Tenant 'Act violated due process inasmuch as the statute
made no provision for notice and hearing prior to sale." The court
discussed the defendant's contention that the taking was accomplished
2$ 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
24 314 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
25 315 F. Supp. 716, 723 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
20 5 Cal. 3d 258, 281, 486 P.2d 1242, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 59 (1971).
27 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970). See also 338 F. Supp. at 619.
28 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970). •
23 Id. at 1100.
80 Id. at 1101.
81 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
82 Id. at 285.
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pursuant to a lease agreement between private parties and ruled that
the lease provision providing for levies and sales did not create an
independent right in the landlord to distrain; instead, the provision
meant that the landlord would have the right to act pursuant to the
statute, and that the tenant would not object to the use of the statutory
distress procedure." The court went on to hold that the waiver was
ineffective and that the statutory procedure amounted to a taking of
property without due process of law!'
An even stronger authority for the Adams decision is Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Co.," where a three-judge district court panel
held that procedural due process demands that notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard be afforded the debtor before his property is taken
pursuant to Article 71 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
or at least that the creditor present the facts allegedly justifying
summary repossession to a "judicial officer."3° Article 71 gave the
creditor the right to summary repossession of his collateral upon
delivery to the sheriff of an affidavit identifying the chattel to be seized
and the value thereof." In invalidating the statute, the court noted that
the fact that Sniadach involved an unsecured interest and in this case
the vendors' interests were secured was immaterial since the replevin
action was not limited to secured transactions.88 The court also
doubted whether the "fine print in the usual consumers conditional
sales contract gives rise to a competent and intelligent waiver of a
constitutional right." 8°
Further support comes from the California Supreme Court decision
in Blair v. Pitchess," an action brought by resident taxpayers to enjoin
the enforcement of California's claim and delivery procedures. The
court held that the state's claim and delivery law violated due process
despite the presence of retained title security agreements which pur-
ported to give the seller the authority to enter and repossess on
default." In summary, both Blair and Laprease stand for the proposi-
tion that due process requires prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard in the case of prejudgment remedies whether or not a purported
waiver has been signed.
In light of the aforementioned decisions, the court's holding in
Adams v. Egley lies within the ambit of Sniadach. Recent Supreme
Court cases have seen in Sniadach not a special constitutional rule for
wages but an important source for the general principle that absent
some compelling state interest, a person must be given the right to
88 Id. at 294.
84 Id. at 294-95.
BB 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
Be Id. at 724.
37 Id. at 719.
BB Id. at 723.
BB Id. at 724.
40 5 Cal 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal, Rptr. 42 (1971).
41 5 Cal. 3d at 275-77, 486 P.2d at 1254-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55.
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notice and hearing before being deprived of some significant interest
by operation of law. 42 Other state and federal court cases have extended
the scope of Sniadach to encompass other "necessities”" as well as
other prejudgment remedies," to secured as well as unsecured cre-
-ditors.45
 The debtor's rights also withstood unknowing waivers in
unconscionable conditional sales contracts." Thus, there was ample
precedent available for the application of the Sniadach constitutional
tests to the facts in Adams v. Egley.
HARRIS J. BELINKIE
42
 Boddie v. Connecticut, ,401 U.S. 371 (1971); California Department of Human
Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) ; Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg and Java require an evidentiary bearing before
welfare benefits can be terminated. Bell extends the requirement of prior notice and hear-
ing to the suspension of the license and registration of a motorist. Boddie applies due
process principles to individuals seeking Judicial dissolution of their marriages.
43
 Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d at 279, 486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57; Randone
v. Appellate Depl of Sup. Ct. of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d at 560, 488 P.2d at 29, 96
'Cal. Rptr. at 725; Laprease v. Rayinours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp, at 723; Jones Press,
Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 210, 176 N.W.2d 87, 90-91 (1970);
Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis.2d 712, 718, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1969); Klim v. Jones, 315
F. Supp. 109, 123 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
44 REM V. Jones, 315 F. Supp. at 124; Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F.
Supp. at 723; Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Sup. Ct. of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d at
563, 4.88 P.2d at 32, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 728; Blair v. Pitchess, 5 ,Cal. 3d at 281, 486 P.2d at
1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 59; Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. at 294.
46 Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. at 723; Blair v, Pitchess, 5
Cal. 3d at 281, 486 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 58-59.
:411 Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. at 294; Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. at 1100.
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